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Abstract
In economic anthropology, the concept of ‘market’ needs a more detailed elaboration. The
traditional distinction between barter and price markets does not sufﬁce. One of the identiﬁable
forms of market in anthropology is the individualized, “subjective” market which is deﬁned by the
question: ”What is my (!) market?”. It is characterized by competitive tension between economic
rivals, not just by a good and an area. Using this concept of the market in the subjective sense,
some aspects of globalized economy look different from hitherto held propositions. One of these
aspects is a global competition law. An earlier draft proposal of an international antitrust code
will be discussed and related to the concept of the subjective market as well as to the ”convention
method” of regulating crossborder legal issues in intellectual property law (the Paris and Berne
Conventions).1
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                  I. 
In economic anthropology, several modes of allocating goods to persons are 
being distinguished. This is a very general way of explaining  how and why 
scarce goods may reach those who are in need of them. The four kinds of 
such assignment of goods to persons in anthropology are  distribution, 
reciprocity, redistribution , and  “market”.
Distribution means the simple hand out of a resource, fo r example a hunted 
deer in a band of hunters and gatherers (anthropology books that only 
describe “exchanges” often do not mention distribution because it no 
exchange). Reciprocity designates an exchange by which one receives 
something, and the other retur ns something, for example in a barter trade. 
Redistribution takes a higher organization, for example by a chieftain or king, 
who first collects from his subjects, and then distributes the collected items to 
himself, his army, and his needy subjects. Finall y, market is said to be the 
institution in which a lot of people meet and barter or trade for some kind of 
money.
This traditional picture of modes of allocation in economic anthropology is  in  need 
of further elaboration, in particular with regard to the  concept of
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the market. There are many more kinds of market than anthropology 
anticipates thus far. The only  accepted distinction as yet is between barter 
and price markets.
Another distinction one should add here is the one between objective and 
subjective market s. An objective market is a market viewed from bird’s eye. 
For example the Taiwanese market, or the European market, each for a 
certain merchandise which is being traded in that territory. A market in the 
objective sense is defined by a good, let us say co mputer hardware, and a 
geographic area, for instance Taiwan. Most microeconomics books do not 
mention a time frame for that market. This is correct because modern 
microeconomics tend to disregard time.  Objective markets are not necessarily 
competitive. For  example, a marble factory at Hualien is not necessarily a 
competitor of a marble dig in Australia because marble is too heavy to be 
transported that far at economically acceptable terms. Still, both the Hualien 
and the Australian marble producers are acti ve on the Far Eastern marble 
market, and the world marble market, both taken in an objective sense. There 
is a European bread market, but nobody ships bread from one end of Europe 
to the other; it would perish. Objective markets are good for statistics, 3
development policies, “industrial policy”, and many issues that are called 
“trade” as distinct from competition (trade regulation is different from 
competition law).
A subjective market is not viewed from a bird’s eye perspection, but from the 
view of a par ticipant, a subject, regularly a merchant or a consumer, who asks 
the question: What is  my  market? If one asks a merchant: “What is  your
market”, she or he will answer: “I am exposed to the competition of at least 
ten firms, and it’s stiff competition.” At  closer sight, the persons active on a 
subjective market are defined by adding the answers to two questions: For 
whom am I  - with my offers  - an alternative; and: who is competing with me 
in trying to attract demand. In other words, the subjective market i s defined 
by competitive tension. For this, a good, an area,  and a time frame  are 
important determinants, but they are not sufficient. The test is competition, 
not just good, area, and time. Those three determinants can only be indicators.
A second distin ction between types of markets that anthropology does not yet 
make but should make is the one between short -range barter or price markets 
without extended credit relations  – that is, markets “at arm’s length”  – on the 
hand, and long -range credit and trust  markets on the other. Anthropologically, 
long-range credit and trust markets are relatively “young phenomena”. As far 
as we know, the earliest date back to the Greek commonwealth (“koiné”) 
around 500 B.C.E. That period of time is often called by historians  and 4
philosophers the “axial age” because of the many changes in religion, morals, 
law and economy between 750 and 400 B.C.E. Long -range trust markets 
before this time are not known. 
On the other hand, not every post -axial-age market is a long -distance t rust 
market. There are post -axial age markets “at arm’s length”, such as the 
typical bazaars in Arabian countries under the rules of Islamic shari’a.
Thus, for the purposes of economic anthropology (but with far -reaching 
effects beyond) we discover three  new pairs of market concepts: objective 
and subjective markets, pre - and post -axial age markets, and short -range 
(barter and price) markets and long -range credit and trust markets.
Against this anthropological background, it is possible to define the free
market system of the West, usually traced to the teachings of the Scottish 
philosopher Adam Smith (1723 -1790). The so -called free market in the sense 
of Western economic teaching is a post -axial age, subjective, long -range trust 
market. Compared with othe r possibilities offered by economic anthropology, 
Adam Smith’s, that is, “our” Western free market system, is something rather 
special. Anthropology knows many more forms which we cannot discuss 
here, but which also deserve their legal protection, because  they exist in this 
world.5
For antitrust policy and law, this means a lot. Antitrust refers to subjective 
markets because it wants to protect competition. Antitrust on long -range 
credit markets ought to look different from antitrust on barter and short -range 
price markets. On objective markets, and on non -market forms of allocation 
of scarce goods, other legal instruments of protection are in place.
Why is this of interest? If one scrutinizes markets anthropologically, many 
objections against globalisation  become moot. Opposition against 
globalisation will remain vivid as long as the distinction between subjective 
and objective markets is not made. Antitrust policy and law should establish, 
maintain, and restore competition on subjective markets. On objecti ve 
markets, there is no competition test, and statistics or structural policies are in 
demand.
If a culture cherishes its own form of a market, or of another (non -market) 
form of economic allocation of the scarce goods, as a rule it deserves 
attention and  respect. On the whole, if subjective markets are the focus of 
consideration, antitrust law has to do with much smaller and non -global 
units.
1 Rivalry is required, actual or potential, not just a merchandise and a 
territory. 
1 For details of this consequence, see Wolfgang Fikentscher, Mehrzielige Marktwirtschaft auf subjektiven 
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Moreover, since anthropology  teaches us that there are other forms of 
allocating scarce goods to those who need them, outside of markets, 
competition cannot be the only yardstick of economic justice to be can be 
applied in an indiscriminate manner. Allocation outside of markets can be
effectuated, for example, by distribution, (non -market) reciprocity, or 
redistribution. Thus, anthropology makes us understand the economies of 
collective goods. For example, if a delegate from Mongolia to the 
International Monetary Fund says: “We need ou r pasture as a collective good 
for the cattle of all of us and insofar want to engage in a distributive 
economy”, this pasture should not be privatized and subjected to private 
property and thus to competition. As yet, the IMF has shown little 
understanding for this kind of argument.
We see that the distinction between forms of allocation of  scarce goods in 
terms of economic anthropology helps us to solve important economic and 
legal issues. In antitrust, the distinction between objective and subjective 
markets narrows down the relevant markets. In economic law in general, this 
distinction gives us a clear separation of trade -related and competition -related 
issues. We can now distinguish between property -plus-competition defined 
markets on the one hand, an d non -market economies pertaining to collective 
goods on the other. For the central concept of antitrust laws, the restraint of 
competition, the requirement of rivalry eliminates the separate test of 7
“appreciability” (sensibilité, Spürbarkeit); since where  there was rivalry 
before the restraint, and no or less rivalry is  after the restraint, there is always 
the necessary appreciability because rivalry is something competitors (and 
hence their suppliers or buyers) feel. By the same token, if the legal policy
underlying antitrust law is to prevent unjustified cartel, exclusionary 
distribution and monopoly rents, on subjective markets (not on objective 
ones), the proof of a restraint of competition triggers the assumption of a 
violation of the antitrust laws, p utting the burden of proof for the 
reasonableness of the restraint upon the  defendant. This is not so under the 
antitrust rules which the European Commission in its “Whitebook” is now 
being proposing as the future EU antitrust law. The simple reason for it s basic 
mistake is that the European Commission does note make a difference 
between subjective and objective markets: on a  subjective market, a restraint 
of trade  must be presumed illegal. 
For neoclassic and neoliberal microeconomics , the introduction o f the 
concept of the subjective market has another impact of general importance. 
As we have seen, the market definition in microeconomics is built upon the 
two requirements of a good and a territory. Correctly, time is neglected 
because modern microeconomi cs disregard the factor time. The subjective 
market, defined by competitive rivalry, occurs for a good, in a territory, and 
during a period of time. Therefore, the theory of the subjective market 
reintroduces the factor time into microeconomics.8
The conce pt of the subjective market has been deduced from economic 
anthropology. Economic anthropology is usually regarded as a sub -field of 
sociocultural anthropology, and sociocultural anthropology as a field of 
cultural anthropology.
2 At a closer look, this is  only half of the truth. 
Objective markets can be classified this way. But subjective markets include 
competitive  behaviour. Behavioural studies, in anthropology, belong to 
ethology (Verhaltensforschung), and thus to biological (or physical) 
anthropology. T hus, subjective markets require a combined study of cultural 
and biological factors, whereas objective markets solely resort under cultural 
anthropology. 
II.
How does the Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC), a private proposal 
for solving the  needs of a worldwide economic law, and aiming at economic 
justice for all participants, try to answer the anthropological demands of the 
various cultures and culture -specific forms of markets mentioned before.
The DIAC offers a pragmatic concept of compe tition for the use in a WTO or 
WIPO convention agreement (and any convention should start from such a 
concept). This pragmatic competition concept markedly differs from the 9
perfect competition model addressed in the WTO Annual Report 1997, vol. 1, 
which is  misleading and no longer up -to-date, and would seriously impede 
rivalry-defined competition. As we have seen, what the books call “market” 
in reality takes several forms: 
First, there is the distinction between objective “anonymous” markets as 
statistical entities defined by good, area, and time, however without 
competitive rivalry, on the one hand, and non -anonymous, competitive, and 
therefore “subjective” markets on the other. A subjective market is the 
aggregate of a market participant’s perspectives  of its alternatives for supply 
or demand.
Secondly, there is the distinction between pre -axial age markets characterised 
by short -range exchange relations such as barter markets or bazaars, and post -
axial age markets shaped by the post -axial age modes of  thought, of which 
some but not all  – according to the prevailing mode of thought  – are 
characterised by far -range exchange relations including credit claims, trust 
relations, and membership rights and duties.
2 See, for example, Wolfgang Fikentscher, Modes of Thought: A Study in the Anthropology of Law and 
Religion, Tuebingen 1995: Mohr  Siebeck, 92; also for the relationship to ethology.10
This results in six possibilities. However in  practice, pre -axial age subjective 
markets, post -axial age objective markets, and post -axial age subjective trust 
markets are the economically more important combinations.
How do these three important combinations relate to the modern world 
economy as con ceived by the World Trade Organization of 1994? By its 
papers and reports, from an anthropological perspective it can easily be 
demonstrated that the WTO errs in identifying world economy with only one 
of the preceding three combinations, namely, with the  post-axial age 
objective market as its concept of economy. All the more so, since it can be 
shown that grave consequences flow from this mistake. The  market economy 
as envisaged by the WTO is not what empirically is “out there” in the 
economic reality. Th e same must be said of World Bank and IMF, as 
evidenced by notorious development blunders. The DIAC tries to be open for 
all kinds of economies.
The subjective market is the market as seen from the point of view of a 
participant of the market. As mentione d before, the opposite concept is the 
objective market, defined by a good, a territory, and a time frame but without 
competition as a constituent factor (for instance, the European bread market). 
Objective markets are good for statistics, and politics; the y deal with issues 
such as development test vs. competition test; trade -related aspects; 
innovation; industrial policy; and trade issues. 11
The theory of the subjective market has another far reaching consequence 
which has not yet been discussed.
3 All book s on micro -economics describe 
the dichotomy of perfect competition and monopoly. Perfect competition is 
defined, in micro -economics, as the activity on a market which is 
characterized by homogenous products, unlimited information, unlimited 
reaction speed,  and infinitesimally small sellers and buyers who are too small 
to engage in strategic behaviour.
Perfect competition denies strategic behaviour among market participants. On 
perfectly competitive markets, there is by definition no rivalry between the 
market participants as competition is practically stifled to zero. Therefore, 
perfect competition is a way to define the absence of competition. The 
mistake has its roots in the fact that the theory of perfect competition 
envisages objective markets, instead  of focusing on subjective markets and 
their strategy -producing alternatives. 
For this reason, for antitrust and unfair trade practices law purposes, the 
common distinction between perfect competition and monopoly as the two 
extremes of market behaviour i s of no use. The correct dichotomy is rivalry -
defined competition on subjective markets on the one hand, and monopoly 
3 See Part I, last paragraphs.12
and perfect competition as two forms of non -rivalry defined market behaviour 
on the other. Needless to say that in addition to the consequ ences described 
above, the concept of the subjective market challenges many basic and firmly 
held micro -and macro -economic assumptions. 
Thus, a comparison of what we call a free market system, including the 
possibilities of engaging in economic activitie s, under anthropological 
scrutiny leads to the conclusion that the free market system is a culture -
specific, namely western, and if applied worldwide, ethnocentric notion. Only 
fragments of anthropological variability are being taken up and included in 
what we often call “the economy”.  
Americans sometimes are inclined to think that in these days “the free market 
system” is on its way to pervade the whole world, and many Europeans share 
this view. Maybe this is so, and should even be welcomed as a step to  world -
wide democracy and equal chances for everyone. But there is also evidence 
that other cultures are afraid of this. The Muslim World cannot agree to 
explicit advertising, the Siberians in their great majority fear democracy more 
then anything else bec ause it leads to the economic destruction of their 
habitat, North American Indians wonder at the ‘frenzy’ (panicking as they 
call it) that comes with the economy -oriented lifestyle of the “Anglos”, and 
many traditional societies fear exploitation and assim ilation. 13
Obviously, there are anthropologically economic variations in this world. 
Consequently, in order to avoid an ethnocentric western world under the 
auspices of WTO and World Bank System, other types of economy, and other 
total economies, must be g iven appropriate standing in WTO and World Bank 
System, such as
- non-competitive distribution strategies, 
- systems of redistribution,
- pre-axial age subjective markets (e.g. barter or other short -range 
exchange), and
- markets with different categories of mar ketable property, anthropologically 
speaking, with different economic spheres.
-
III. 
What are the additional features of the DIAC in relation to the insights from 
economic anthropology gained before?
Basically, there are four legal ways of dea ling with cross -border issues: (1) 
Uniform law, (2) harmonized law, (3) the convention approach, and  (4) 
conflicts-of law (“choice -of-law”). These are the most commonly applied 
normative settings for solving cases which involve more than one legal 
system.14
(1) Uniform law is the most complete and the least frequently achieved 
approach; an example is the Geneva uniform bills of exchange and check law 
of 1930. The abortive Havana Charter of 1948 aimed at a uniform antitrust 
law, the UNCTAD Restrictive Business P ractices Code of 1980 is uniform 
antitrust “soft law” (non -binding).
(2) Harmonized law is less than uniform. It narrows the distinctions between 
national laws while leaving minute differences to national legislature. EC 
directives lead to harmonised national  legislation. The American Law 
Institute prepares harmonised state law.
(3) Convention law has an even less harmonizing effect. Convention law allows 
to implement national laws for solving cross -border cases while avoiding 
heavy inroads to claims of national  sovereignty. The Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 and the Revised Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Copyrights are the two leading examples 
(the U.S. is a member since 1887 and 1989). These conventions for the 
protection of “intellectual property” make use of the following principles:
a) application of national law to cross -border cases; 
b) national treatment of foreigners inside the country where protection is          
sought (to avoid domestic discrimination);15
c) minimum st andards representing common approaches or commitments of 
protection to correct “consensus wrongs” in a non -discriminating manner 
outside the country where protection is sought (to avoid a significant 
discrimination between the member states); a list of min imum standards will 
be given  – in context with other results  - in the summary;
4
d) the “union principle” which permits contemporaneous membership in 
successive revisions of the convention (to permit flexibility and varying 
degrees of progress in the regulatio n of concern without loosening national 
membership); and 
e) the absence of a most -favoured-nation (MFN) clause (to permit the 
application of the union principle, supra d), and the establishment of bilateral 
agreements which often contain experiments in impro vements of protection).
(4) The fourth possibility of dealing with cross -border cases is the conflicts -of-
law approach. It is often called “choice -of-law approach” because in contract 
law the parties are in principle permitted to opt for a national law to dea l with 
a cross -border case. But in many cross -border cases, there is no such freedom. 
Rather, many conflict rules of  national law require mandatory application. 
Antitrust cases concern inequitable behaviour, comparable to torts. In general, 
remedies again st unfair trade practices are tort actions. The nexus between a 
4 See IV, under 4., below.16
tort case and the applicable national law is the place of the wrong ( forum 
delicti commissi ). In essence, the place -of-the-wrong rule is mandatory.
The place of the wrong may be inside or out side of the country where the 
antitrust or unfair trade practice offence has been committed. If it is inside the 
country, national law applies. If it is located outside the country where the 
action is brought,  foreign law (antitrust, or unfair trade practi ces torts law) 
applies and is being adjudicated by national courts rather than the law of the 
forum.
This difficult situation is aggravated by the fact that the conflict -of-law rules 
may not only lead to the application of foreign national substantive law  but 
also to national conflicts -of-laws rules. The latter is rather the rule than the 
exception. Then, the issues of  renvoi and third -law application must be 
decided.
Thus, resorting to the conflicts -of-law approach usually leads to the call for 
an intern ational harmonisation of the national conflicts -of-law rules. At this 
point, the experts tend to favour the harmonisation of the substantive laws of 
these countries interested in regulating their cross -border issues, rather than 
harmonising their conflicts -of-law rules.17
It was precisely this quagmire that caused the interested nations to conclude 
the Paris and the Berne Conventions, a low -level substantive (and not 
conflicts-of-laws oriented) harmonisation approach (“minimum standards”), 
in the field of in tellectual property protection.
The Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC) offers such low -level 
harmonisation minimum standards of substantive law, while leaving detailed 
and “custom -tailored” regulation to national legislature. It thereby aims at 
safeguarding national traditions and economic cultures by use of general 
clauses such as the Anglo -American common law principle of the rule of 
reason. Anti -dumping is a practice extending into unfair trade practices law.
The DIAC is intended to demonstrate  the possibility of applying the 
convention approach to antitrust matters. Unfair trade practices rules, in 
particular antidumping rules, can be added.  In its various sections, a menu to 
choose from is offered.
For preparing a transnational competition la w, a cooperation between WIPO 
and WTO would be helpful in drafting an international code. WIPO could 
contribute its experience in the administration of the Paris and the Revised 
Berne Convention. WTO could undertake the code’s actual implementation, 
relying on its procedural machinery including its panel jurisdiction. Existing 
institutional mechanisms between WIPO and WTO could be used. It is 18
noteworthy that the recently published WIPO Model on Unfair Practices 
Rules does not tackle unfair pricing such as mo nopolistic discriminations.
The proposed convention treaty on free and fair competition would co -exist 
along with the already existing and expanding network of bilateral antitrust 
assistance treaties and agreements. Besides regulating special bilateral is sues 
of competitive trade and merger control policies, these treaties and 
agreements would serve as precursors and in part as models for the 
establishment and further development of a multilateral international 
convention instrument. In the light of the on going globalisation of economic 
relations, to rely solely on bilateralism may prove to be insufficient.
Reference may be made to the antitrust enforcement agreements between the 
U.S. and the EC, Australia, Canada and Germany.
                                       IV.
To summarize:                  
1. In view of the tasks given to the WTO by the world community a 
transnational antitrust and fair competition system is indispensable. “Free” 
and “fair, in this sense, means a non -discriminatory level playing field, 
covering, inter alia, the anti -dumping law. “ Transnational”, in this sense, 19
means a law that is binding on the nation states and also  – in contrast to 
classical international law  - entitles and obligates their citizens.
2. This transnational antitrust and fair competition system should seek its model 
in the Paris Convention on the international protection of patents and against 
unfair competition of 1883, and the parallel Revised Berne Convention on the 
international protect ion of copyrights of 1886. Most governments are 
members of both conventions.
3. Under this “convention approach”, the following principles of law prevail:
- national law (not international or “world” law such as in the abortive 
Havana Charter),
- national  treatment, to prevent transborder discrimination inside of a member 
state, 
- minimum standards for preventing “consensus wrongs”, committed in 
transborder transactions between the member states,
- the “union principle”, to enable revision conferences, a nd thereby progress 
and development, among a limited number of members, while maintaining 
the membership of all.20
- there should be no most -favoured nation clause, in order to leave the road 
open to bilateral antitrust and fair competition agreements, cont aining special 
entitlements, obligations, and cooperation in general. “Most -favoured nation” 
(MFN) would preclude such bilateral “experimenting”. It would also preclude 
the union principle (3, supra) and its revision mechanism. Art. 4 TRIPS 
which provides  for a most -favoured nation clause should be repealed or 
modified.
4. The minimum standards, intended to prevent the commitment of “consensus 
wrongs”, ought to include:
a) a prohibition of horizontal agreements in restraint of trade; 
b) a prohibition of abusive d istribution systems;
c) a regulation of restraints of competition based upon intellectual       
property    protection;
d) merger control; 
e) a prohibition of abusive market domination;
f) a provision against circumventions of a) through e);
g) a rule of reason exemptio n covering a) through f) that allows due 
consideration of culture -specific forms of economy;
h) minimum sanctions which would include deconcentration, divestiture or 
dissolution of past mergers and monopolies;21
i) minimum procedural rules which could be borrowed  from the existing and 
already working panel jurisdiction of the WTO;
j) a rule against unfair trade practices under Art.10 bis Paris Convention. 
5. The concept of competition should be pragmatic, not theory -burdened. This 
implies that competition includes riva lry (subjective market), and thus a 
restraint of competition lessens this rivalry (“material and appreciable 
restraint of competition”). This also implies that for a transnational antitrust 
and fair competition law, the model of perfect competition and oth er non -
rivalry defined (“objective market”) models are misguided. A market is a 
market of a firm, a buyer, a supplies, a consumer, etc., under culture -specific 
conditions.
6. In all, and in brief, what is needed is a convention, similar to the existing 
Paris  and Berne Conventions for the international protection of intellectual 
property, for the international protection of competition, and this transnational 
antitrust and fair competition convention should be integrated into the 
existing panel system of the WTO.
7. To this end, the members of the DIAC -Group submitted their proposal of an 
“International Antitrust Code”. They suggest that efforts be continued.